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Appellee, Audrey Lynne Athay Dow ("Mrs. Dow"), by and through her 
attorney, P. Kent Card, files this Brief in Opposition to the Appeal by Frank K. Gilroy 
("Mr. Gilroy"). 
JURISDICTION 
Mrs. Dow in filing this Petition seeks a judicial declaration establishing Mr. 
Gilroy as her biological father (legitimation); however, Mrs. Dow is not seeking support 
from Mr. Gilroy. Petition for Paternity ("Petition") R at 1; Tf 5, R. at 3. In response to the 
Petition, Mr Gilroy filed a Motion to Dismiss based on the statute of limitations defense. 
R. at 17-18. The Trial Court, the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki, denied Mr. Gilroy's Motion 
to Dismiss. R. at 63-64. Mr. Gilroy then filed a petition with the Supreme Court seeking 
permission to file an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted the petition and 
poured the case over to the Court of Appeals. R. at 67. The Court of Appeals noted 
jurisdiction of the appeal under Utah Code § 78-2a-3(2)(I)(Supp. 1994) and granted the 
petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal nun pro tunc. Therefore, jurisdiction 
is proper in the Court of Appeals as set forth in the Order of the Utah Court of Appeals 
dated May 10, 1995. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENT FOR REVIEW 
Whether the filing of the Petition by Mrs. Dow under the Uniform Act on 
Paternity, Utah Code § 78-45a-l et seq. (the "Paternity Act"), to establish paternity, absent 
any claim to enforce a support liability, may be barred by the statute of limitations in light 
of Utah Case Law and Statutes. 
Whether the statutes of limitation contained in the Paternity Act, Utah Code 
§ 78-45a-3 and Utah Code § 78-45a-4, are specific statutes of limitation enacted to supplant 
the general statutes of limitation of Utah Code § 78-12-1 and Utah Code § 78-12- 25(3). 
Whether the Utah State Legislature intended to exclude from the Paternity Act 
a filing limitation period where the sole issue is legitimation and where other states include 
such statutes of limitation in their Paternity Acts. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court's application of a statute of limitations is a question of law that 
the Court of Appeal reviews for "correctness." St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hospital 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). Initially, the court examines a 
statute's plain language and resort[s] to other methods of statutory interpretation only if the 
language is ambiguous." State v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d 492 (Utah App. 1993). Further, 
if neither party has provided this court with any legislative history or other evidence of 
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legislative intent... we must look to related case law and "relevant policy considerations" 
for guidance. Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991). 
CONTROLLING CITATIONS 
The following cases and statutes are controlling: 
Nielsen, State Dept, ofS.S. v. Hansen, 564 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1977). 
Szarakv. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). 
Utah Code § 78-45a-3. Limitation on recovery from the father. 
The father's liability for past education and necessary support are 
limited to a period of four years next preceding the commencement of an 
action. 
Utah Code § 78-45a-4. Limitations on recovery from father's estate. 
The obligation of the estate of the father for liabilities under this act 
are limited to amounts accrued prior to his death and such sums as may be 
payable for dependency under other laws. 
Utah Code § 78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions generally. 
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods precribed in 
this chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except in specific cases 
where a different limitation is prescribed by statute. 
Utah Code § 78-12-25(3). Within four years. 
An action for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mrs. Dow in filing her Petition seeks a declaration that Mr. Gilroy is her 
biological father, she is not seeking support from Mr. Gilroy. Petition R at 1; f 5, R. at 3. 
Mr. Gilroy, in response, filed a Motion to Dismiss based on the statute of limitations 
defense. R. at 17-18. The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki denied Mr. Gilroy's Motion to 
Dismiss. R. at 63-64. Next, Mr. Gilroy filed a petition for permission to file an 
interlocutory appeal which was granted and the Supreme Court poured the case over to the 
Court of Appeals. R. at 67. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mrs. Dow was bom on October 5,1943, in Salt Lake City, Utah and is the 
daughter of Audrey Athay ("Ms. Athay"), deceased October 2, 1969. R. at 3-4. 
2. Ms. Athay told Mrs. Dow that Mr. Gilroy is her biological father. R. at 
4. 
3. Ms. Athay further told Mrs. Dow that she had sexual intercourse with and 
only with Mr. Gilroy during the time of Mrs. Dow's conception. R. at 8. 
4. Throughout Mrs. Dow's life, Mr. Gilroy made regular contact with her and 
continued to be in contact with Mrs. Dow until the filing of this Petition. R. at 3. 
5. On July 14, 1994, Mrs. Dow filed this Petition for a declaration that she 
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is the biological daughter of Mr. Gilroy. She is not seeking support from Mr. Gilroy. R. 
at 26-27. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mrs. Dow's Petition is based on the Paternity Act and Mrs. Dow is pursuing 
this Petition in full compliance with the Paternity Act and Utah case law. Further, the 
Paternity Act itself contains 2 specific statutes of limitation and without further legislative 
enactments prohibiting such actions, the Petition must proceed. Accordingly, the District 
Court correctly denied Mr. Gilroy's Motion to Dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A PATERNITY ACTION FILED FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE 
OF LEGITIMATION, WITHOUT A CLAIM FOR SUPPORT, 
IS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
A. Utah Case Law Confirms that a Paternity Action Filed Solely 
for Legitimation is not Barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
Utah case law supports Mrs. Dow's Petition and rejects the statute of 
limitations defense raised by Mr. Gilroy because Mrs. DoWs Petition is filed solely to 
establish paternity. In Nielsen, State Dept. ofS.S. v. Hansen, 564 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1977), 
the Utah Supreme Court in reversing the trial court's dismissal of the Complaint on the 
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ground that the statute of limitations1 prevents recovery, concluded: "We are unable to find 
any time limitation as to when a suit may be instituted to determine paternity." [emphasis 
added] Id. at 1114. The Justices in Nielsen unanimously agreed there is no statute of 
limitations in a suit filed solely to determine paternity. Chief Justice Ellett issued the main 
opinion. Justice Crockett concurred in the main opinion and in Justice Hall's concurring 
opinion. Justice Hall wrote: 
However, this section [78-12-22, U.C.A.] pertains only to the 
issue of support and maintenance and does not encompass 
determinations of paternity which are separately and specifically 
provided for in Section 78-45a-l, ff, U.C. A. 1953 (Uniform Act 
on Paternity), and while there is no limitation as to when a suit 
may be instituted to determine paternity. Section 3 thereof 
provides: 
The father's liabilities for past education and 
necessary support are limited to a period of four 
years next preceding the commencement of an 
action. 
It is therefore clear that the Legislature has seen fit to 
specifically provide an eight year statute of limitations on the 
recovery of support and maintenance generally, but where 
paternity has not been determined and is in dispute such must 
first be determined and recovery of support and maintenance is 
1
 78-12-22, U.C.A. 1953 (1975 Pocket Supp.); is one of limitations. It says: 
Within eight years. 
* * * 
An action to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure to provide support or 
maintenance for dependent children. 
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then limited to the period of four years next preceding the 
commencement of the paternity action, [emphasis Added] 
Id. at 1115. Next, in his dissenting opinion Justice Maughan agreed there is no limitation 
barring an action based solely to establish paternity. Justice Maughan wrote: 
Succinctly stated, the statute and Martinez clearly state: if eight 
years have elapsed, since the inception of the claim, any action 
to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure to 
provide support for dependent children, is barred. Conversely, 
any action brought for the purpose of establishing paternity, but 
not to enforce a support liability, is not barred, [emphasis 
added] 
Id. Justice Wilkins concurred in Justice Maughan's dissent. 
Because Mrs. Dow's Petition is based solely to establish paternity, not to 
enforce a support liability, her Petition may not be barred by the statute of limitations. 
In Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1981), a paternity action was filed 
by the mother and State Department of Social Services and sought a determination of 
paternity coupled with a claim for child support. The action was filed six years after the 
birth of the child. The Court in Szarak noted: "In Nielsen v. Hansen, supra, the Court's 
opinion states: We are unable to find any time limitation as to when a suit may be instituted 
to determine paternity.1 564 P.2d at 1114. There was no dissent from that statement." 
[emphasis added] Id. at 1084. 
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The Court in Szarak did note two additional statutes of limitation raised by the 
defendant as compared to defenses raised in Nielsen. The statutes are Utah Code § 78-12-25 
(4 year limitation) and Utah Code § 78-12-26 (3 year limitation). The Court in Szarak 
considered the additional statutes but instead ruled that the Paternity Act is tolled by Utah 
Code § 78-12-36 for all statutorily qualified plaintiffs during the period of the child's 
minority. Therefore, questions regarding the additional statutes of limitation raised in Szarak 
and their application to the Paternity Act, if any, remain unsettled. 
B. Utah Statutes of Limitation do not Bar a Paternity 
Action Filed Solely for Legitimation. 
Mrs. Dow's Petition is based on the Paternity Act as found in Utah Code § 78-
45a-l et seq. Contained in the Paternity Act are 2 statutes of limitation: Utah Code § 78-45a-
3 and Utah Code § 78-45a-4. These statutes provide as follows: 
Utah Code § 78-45a-3. Limitation on recovery from the father. 
The father's liability for past education and necessary support are 
limited to a period of four years next preceding the commencement of an 
action. 
Id. 
Utah Code § 78-45a-4. Limitations on recovery from father's estate. 
The obligation of the estate of the father for liabilities under this act 
are limited to amounts accrued prior to his death and such sums as may be 
payable for dependency under other laws. 
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Id. Therefore, the Paternity Act limits the father's liability or his estate's liability for 
support. The Paternity Act, however, does not limit the time period for an action filed solely 
to establish paternity. 
A distinction is found in the types of statutes of limitation. A "specific" 
statute of limitation is a limitation found within the specific statute itself or is otherwise 
prescribed by statute. A "specific" statute of limitation, for example, is found in Utah Code 
§ 75-3-107. This "specific" statute of limitation provides for a 3 year statute of limitation 
from the date of a decedent's death in which a petition from probate of a will can be filed. 
Utah Code §75-3-107. 
The other type of statute is a "general" statute of limitation. A "general" 
statute of limitation is applied in conjunction with Utah Code § 78-12-1 which states: 
Utah Code § 78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions generally. 
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods 
prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, 
except in specific cases where a different limitation is prescribed 
by statute, [emphasis added] 
Id 
Mr. Gilroy claims the general statute of limitation as found in Utah Code § 78-
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12-25(3) is dispositive because it provides a 4 year statute of limitation for "[a]n action for 
relief not otherwise provided for by law." 
However, the Paternity Act contains 2 statutes of limitation. The Paternity Act 
is a specific statute or instance where a different limitation is prescribed by the Legislature. 
Therefore, any attempt to apply Utah Code § 78-12-1 or Utah Code § 78-12-25(3) as the 
statute of limitation in this action fails because the legislature already provided its own, 
different types of limitation in the Paternity Act. Utah Code § 78-45a-3 and Utah Code § 78-
45a-3. The Legislature also provided an 8 year statute of limitation for recovery of support 
in Utah Code § 78-12-22. If the Utah State Legislature intended to limit a Petition based 
solely to establish paternity, certainly such a statute would be enacted. In addition, it is the 
provenance of the Legislature to create such a limitation, not for the court to judicially 
legislate one. 
C. Application to Mrs. Dow's Petition. 
In Mrs. Dow's Petition she seeks legitimation several years after she was 
notified by her mother that Mr. Gilroy is her natural father. Mrs. Dow is a licensed 
psychologist and has received her Ph.D. in psychology. She desires to have her legitimacy 
issues resolved, not only for herself, but for her children and their children. Mrs. Dow is 
entitled to and is provided a right of legitimation. If Mrs. Dow's legitimation does not take 
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place, her injury continues. If Mrs. Dow's legitimation cannot take place, her injury is 
irreparable. And according to Nielsen, "[i]f [Mr. Gilroy] has any defenses to raise because 
of laches, etc., he can do so by answer. He cannot prevail by having the complaint 
dismissed." Nielsen, 564P.2dat 1114. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, for these reasons, Mrs. Dow requests this Court to affirm the 
Order entered by the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki dismissing Mr. Gilroy's Motion to 
Dismiss. 
DATED t h i s / T c J a y o f M y , 1995 
it Card 
Attorney for Appellee, 
Audrey Lynne Athay Dow 
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